Descartes#
Sections#
- Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)
- Meditation I: Concerning Those Things That Can Be Called into Doubt
- Meditation II: Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind: That It Is Better Known Than the Body
- Meditation III: Concerning God, That He Exists
- Meditation IV: Concerning the True and the False
- Meditation V: Concerning the Essence of Material Things, and Again Concerning God, That He Exists
- Meditation VI: Concerning the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body
- Elisabeth’s Objection
Notes#
IDEA
a representational mode of thought
OBJECTIVE BEING/REALITY of the idea
the being/reality of the representational content of the idea
the being/reality a thing has in virtue of being represented by an idea
FORMAL BEING/REALITY of the idea
the being/reality a thing has in virtue of its existence (ideas exist, objects exist)
God has objective being
formal reality vs objective reality
objective reality only applies to ideas
my cat (formal) finite substance; no objective reality
my mind (formal) finite substance; no objctive reality
blue - mode of a finite substance; no objective reality
idea of a dragon - idea is a mode; (objective reality) finite substance
idea of god - the idea is a mode; (objective reality) infinite substance
intellect offers up propositions, the will ascents to it, rejects it, or withholds judgment
C&D principle should apply to both intellect and will
Dualism: mind and body are two distinct substances, not reducible to each other, exist independently of each other, but are in causal interaction with each other, mind can cause effects in the body and vice versa
Objection to Dualism: there is no physical contact
the problem of other minds (solipsism) -> plausible inference
Third Set of Objections (76,77)
Hobbes, materialist
the proof of the existence of the self is okay
the proof of thinking thing is infinite regress
Descartes: if there’s an act, then there’s a subject; the act of thinking must belong to a subject
Hobbes: you defined mind in terms of the act of thinking; if mind is an act, then you need another subject
the subjects of all acts are material, all acts must be done by material subjects
Fourth Set of Objections, the Circularity Charge (petitio percicii?)
a circular argument is called question-begging
God exists, therefore C&D holds; C&D proves God’s existence
actual or current C&D perceptions (self-evident, don’t need God) vs past C&D perceptions (recollections)
awareness (clear cognition) vs scientific knowledge (scientia)
awareness is immediate
scientific knowledge requires god
the mind, there are ideas in the mind: this proves that the mind exists
from the idea of God, we prove the existence of God
what about the external, material world?
we cannot be sure that ideas correspond to real objects
how to we get out of the mind and assert the existnece of bodily things
we have clear and distinct perceptions and the idea of God
Med6, the existence of extended beings
common-sense realism, since Aristotle: there are external/physical things
we have representations/ideas of these things
the common sense assumption is that our representations/ideas resemble the objects themselves
Med3 proof of God’s existence
starting point: the idea of God
the question of the causal source: what is the source of the idea? the idea can only come from God
what can be the source of an idea? my own mind, maybe the idea is fictitious (voluntary)
other option: the idea comes from outside myself, from other objects, maybe the idea is advantageous (involuntary)
third option: its native/innate, located by God
the same kind of logic is operative in the proof of the external world
I am a mind; thinking substance
the mind has modes of thinking
imagination
sensation
first premise: the imagination and sense are my modes of thinking
that is to say, they don’t exist on their own but only in relation to me
modes of motion cannot exist without extended things
second premise: motion and all related properties seem to be modes of physical/material substances (extended)
I proved that I am a thinking being, my mind exists, so premise 1 is done
premise 2 is still hypothetical
third premise: I have ideas of extended substances (my body, other bodies)
what is the source of these ideas?
is it me? no bc they come to me against my will
it comes from outside, passively
extended substances themselves
other possibility, God is making me think these ideas
infinite substance could produce all ideas, but he doesn’t bc he’s not a desire
Med2 conditional completed in Med6
process of elimination God+ClearandDistinctIdeas
Princess, Gassendi
mind (thinking substance, not in space), body (extended substance, in space)
the two substances causally interact
causal interaction seems to require physical contact in space
if something’s not composed of parts it cannot die by decomposition
pineal gland
circularity charge
modus tollens
if (I know that) p, then q (I’m not a brain in a vat) not q (I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat) therefore not (I know that) p
deception -> something to be deceived (mental state) -> cosciousness/mind/subject of thought
action requires actor/subject, thought requires thinker
deceptions, doubts may all be false, but require a mind
Descartes’ Ontology
substance (thing)
attribute (necessary feature): thinking
mode (contingent feature): doubt, imagination, etc. all mental activities
foundations
do I exist?: I (can) think, therefore (I know that) I exist
what kind of a thing am I?: I am a mind, a thinking thing (res cogitans)
if bodies existed, they would be extended (res extensa)
Galileo’s primary vs secondary
Texts#
Cottingham, John. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.
Frankfurt, Harry. Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’ Meditations.
Grosholz, Emily. Cartesian Method and the Problem of Reduction. OUP.
Terms#
[S][W] Descartes, Rene (1596-1650)
[S][W] Cogito Ergo Sum
[S][W] Dream Argument
[S][W] Evil Demon
[S][W] Cartesian/Hyperbolic Doubt (Global Skepticism)
[S][W] Res cogitans [thought]
[S][W] Res extensa [extension]
[S][W] Substance Dualism
Arnauld
[S] Arnauld, Antoine
Elizabeth
[S] Elizbeth, Princess of Bohemia
Gassendi
[S] Gassendi, Pierre
Malebranche